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IN DEFENSE OF EXPERIMENTATION WITH 
AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE 
Carl Tobias• 
It would be presumptuous of me to criticize either view articulat-
ed, and even worse form to choose sides, in the recent dispute over 
the merits of automatic disclosure that graced the pages of this 
journal.1 Federal civil procedure cognoscenti need no introduction 
to these highly respected participants in, and students of, the 
federal courts. Former Judge Griffin B. Bell rendered distin-
guished service on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit before President Jimmy Carter appointed him Attorney 
General. Senior Judge William W Schwarzer compiled an excellent 
record of service as a judge of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California and was a prolific, frequently 
cited writer on federal civil procedure before he assumed the post 
of Director of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC).2 
Only an author more foolish than I, therefore, would take on 
either of these federal court giants. Fortunately for me, several 
factors make that unnecessary. First, there is considerable merit 
to what Judge Bell and Judge Schwarzer propose, and both have 
thoroughly and carefully enunciated the cases for their respective 
positions on the merits of various proposals for automatic disclo-
sure. Second, it is virtually impossible to ascertain which judge is 
correct due to the paucity of relevant empirical information that is 
currently available. Indeed, it may well be that each is right and 
*Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable 
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the 
Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1 See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclcsure in Discovery-TN! Rush to Reform, 27 
GA. L. REv. 1 (1993); William W Schwarzer, Jn Defense of'"Automalic Disclosure in Discou-
ery", 27 GA. L. REv. 655 (1993). For purposes of convenience, I refer to Judge Bell as the 
author of the first article; this is not meant to accord less credit to the other able authors of 
the article, Chilton Davis Varner and Hugh Q. Gottschalk. 
2 See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Rule II Reuisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1988); 
William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under tN! New Federal Rule II-A ClOSt!r Look, 104 F .R.D. 
181 (1985). He has remained an active writer. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 1; William 
W Schwarzer, Slaying tN! Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be More Effective 
Than. Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178 (1991). 
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both are wrong in some measure. 
All of these considerations indicate that discretion is the better 
part of valor. The preferable approach, accordingly, is to mediate 
this controversy by applying a substantial dose of that much-touted 
tonic, alternative dispute resolution. My purpose is to discover a 
pragmatic, feasible solution to the difficulties posed by the proposal 
for automatic disclosure which the United States Supreme Court 
transmitted to Congress on April 22, 19933 and to the disagree-
ment over that proposal between Judge Bell and Judge Schwarzer. 
I find that remedy in the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990,4 
which affords an extremely effective vehicle for treating this 
dispute. 
I. THE DISPUTE 
Brief examination of the dispute over the automatic disclosure 
proposal is warranted. Many federal court observers across a broad 
political spectrum, including parties, lawyers, and judges who 
participate in federal civil litigation, agree that numerous problems 
attend modem discovery, namely excessive discovery, abusive 
discovery, and expense and delay.5 There appears to be equally 
widespread opposition to the automatic disclosure proposal among 
3 See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENTS 
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE AND FORMS, H.R. Doc. 74, 103d Cong., let 
Sees. (1993) (on file with the Georgia Law Review) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT TRANS· 
MI'ITAL]. 
4 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1993)). Others have advocated similar general 
approaches. Critics of the first automatic disclosure proposal developed by the Advisory 
Committee suggested limited experimentation. See Bell, supra note 1, at 31·32; see also infra 
note 23 and accompanying text (discussing automatic disclosure procedures recommended 
by 1991 Advisory Committee). Judge Bell makes an analogous recommendation. See Bell, 
supra note 1, at,53-57. Indeed, the Advisory Committee subscribed to such an' approach for 
a brief time. See id. at 34-35. I elaborate these general approaches in an effort to afford 
Congress specific, concrete guidance for implementation and for treating the automatic 
disclosure proposal. 
5 See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Litigation: 
Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 579; Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery 
Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263 (1992); Committee on Discovery, New York Bar Association, 
Report on Discovery Under Rule 26(bXl), in 127 F.R.D. 625 (1990). 
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similarly diverse participants in federal civil litigation.6 Judge 
Bell articulates five principal ideas to support his contention that 
the disclosure proposal is flawed,7 while Judge Schwarzer evalu-
ates those propositions and emphasizes significant features of the 
proposal which he believes are relevant to its adoption.8 
Justice Antonin Scalia, in his dissenting statement opposing 
transmittal of the -disclosure proposal, subscribed to many ideas 
offered by Judge Bell.9 Justice Scalia observed that the new 
regime would "perhaps worst of all, introduce into the trial process 
an element that is contrary to the nature of our adversary sys-
tem."10 He found it "most imprudent to embrace such a radical 
alteration that [had not received] any significant testing on a local 
level."11 Justice Scalia added that Judge Schwarzer himself had 
recognized the need for analogous experimentation prior to the 
promulgation of a national requirement when Judge Schwarzer 
advocated a considerably more extreme disclosure proposal four 
years ago.12 
Justice Scalia considered it more important that Congress 
similarly had found such local experimentation with disclosure to 
be essential "before major revision"13 and had created an experi-
mental program for federal trial courts under the Civil Justice 
6 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 1, at 28-32 and sources cited therein; Thomas M. Mangler, 
Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F .R.D. 
155 (1991); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery 
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991). 
1 See Bell, supra note 1, at 5, 41-46. For example, Judge Bell suggests that the proposal's 
vagueness will increase motion practice and foster overproduction while automatic disclosure 
will increase expense. Id. 
8 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 655-64. 
9 See SUPREME COURTTRANsMl'ITAL, supra note 3, at 107-09 (Scalin, J., dissenting) (citing 
Bell et al., supra note 1). For instance, Justice Scalia contends that the proposal will 
increase motion practice and expense. Id. at 107 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 
7 (discussing similar criticism by Judge Bell). 
10 SUPREME COURT TRANsMl'ITAL, supra note 3, at 104 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
11 Id. at 108. 
12 Id. (citing William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and 
Discovery Reform, 50 U. Pl'IT. L. REv. 703, 723 (1989) (suggesting adoption of his disclosure 
proposal only after successful "trial period•)); see also Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary 
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 
1361 (1978) (similar recognition by another advocate of discovery reform and participant in 
development or current disclosure proposal). 
13 SUPREME COURT TRANSMI'ITAL, supra note 3, at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Reform Act (CJRA).14 The statute prescribes experimentation 
with some form of cooperative discovery for not less than three 
years in many of the ninety-four districts and mandates that the 
Judicial Conference of the United States prepare a report and 
recommendations on certain of these efforts for Congress by 
1995.15 This experimentation is the linchpin for reconciling the 
differences between Judge Bell and Judge Schwarzer. It concomi-
tantly enables Congress to treat effectively the national automatic 
disclosure proposal that the Court forwarded, thereby averting a 
potential collision between that proposal and local experimentation 
under the CJRA.16 
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Congress may follow numerous courses of action. It could simply 
allow the controversial national automatic discovery proposal to 
become effective in December 1993 by inaction.17 For reasons 
enumerated above, this manner of proceeding is inadvisable.18 
Preferably, Congress might also attempt to resolve the controversy 
over the efficacy of the automatic disclosure proposal that it is 
currently considering. 
Congress could collect, analyze, and synthesize information on 
experimentation with automatic disclosure in the approximately 
twenty-five Early Implementation District Courts (EIDCs) that 
have instituted the procedure.19 The Federal Judicial Center, the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), or the 
14 Id. (citing Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 104-105, 104 
Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1993))); see also 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 
1993) (providing guidance to district courts for formulation of experimental programs). 
15 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 5089, 5097-98. 
18 The collision will be between the national disclosure rule and the inconsistent local 
rules adopted in the federal districts. See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Ciuil 
Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139, 139 (1993). 
17 See SUPREME COURT TRANSMITI'AL, supra note 3, at l; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (Supp. 
1993) ("Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule 
is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law. n). 
18 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (highlighting some criticisms of quick 
adoption of proposal). 
19 See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CML JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
REPORT, Exhibit D (June 1, 1992) (providing profiles of districts experimenting with 
automatic disclosure). 
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EIDCs themselves may have some relevant material. Correspond-
ingly, Congress could schedule hearings to elicit testimony on the 
efficacy of automatic disclosure in the EID Cs and on the automatic 
discovery proposal that is now before it.20 
The prospects for the success of these efforts are rather limited, 
however. For example, many EIDCs have had less than eighteen 
months in which to experiment with and evaluate automatic 
disclosure, most districts have relied on a procedure different from 
the one transmitted by the Supreme Court, some apparently did 
not create baselines against which to measure that technique's 
effects, and few districts seem to have undertaken rigorous efforts 
to gather, assess, and synthesize information on the mechanism's 
efficacy. 
The preferable approach is for Congress to suspend the effective 
date of the automatic disclosure proposal presently under consider-
ation and to suspend debate temporarily over the efficacy of that 
proposal and other disclosure procedures. Congress, in consultation 
with the FJC, AO, EIDCs, or others possessing relevant expertise, 
such as Judge Bell, Judge Schwarzer, and Magistrate Judge Wayne 
Brazil, and federal court litigators, such as Bob Gibbins, Greg 
Joseph, Laura Kaster, and Loren Kieve,21 should then identify a 
small number of automatic disclosure procedures that apparently 
have the greatest promise. Congress could prescribe experimenta-
tion with various forms of automatic disclosure for three to five 
years22 in fewer than all ninety-four federal districts. 
20 Congress might also explore the efficacy of the national rule revision procedures that 
it instituted in the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act and the poU!ntio.1 inconsistency between 
the Federal Rules and local rules adopted to implement the c.JRA. These topics are beyond 
the scope of this piece, however. For a discussion of these topics, see Carl Tobias, Ciuil 
Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Ciuil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 
(1992) [hereinafter To bias, Balkanization] (analyzing the progressive bo.lknnimtion of federal 
civil procedure, especially in the passage of the c.JRA, and its detrimental implications for 
federal judges, lawyers, and litigants); Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Ciuil Justice Reform 
Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Recalibrating] (examining require-
ments ofc.JRA and its implementation in EIDCs and offering suggestioOB to a-0lve problems 
with early reform efforts). 
21 This list obviously is not intended to be comprehensive. 
22 My choice of this specific time frame is tailored to that prescribed in the c.JRA. See 
supra note 15 and accompanying text; cf. JUDICrAL CONFE~CE OF THE UmTED STATES 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELn.UNARY' DRAFT OF PROPOSED 
.AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
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This approach actually would be less complicated and more cost-
effective than it might appear, because the structure for experimen-
tation already exists in the Civil Justice Reform Act and its 
implementation. For instance, nearly all of the EIDCs presently 
imposing automatic disclosure premised their procedures on a 1991 
Advisory Committee draft requiring disclosure of information that 
"bears significantly on any claim or defense. "23 In April 1992, the 
Committee replaced this stricture with the requirement that 
litigants disclose "discoverable information relevant to disputed 
facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."24 
The EIDCs experimenting with the language in the first draft 
should continue to do so, while a somewhat smaller number of 
districts currently completing their civil justice expense and delay 
reduction plans probably should experiment with the second draft 
(the proposal now before Congress), unless either formulation 
appears to be unworkable.25 A few districts might experiment 
with the "meet and confer" procedure proposed by Judge Bell.26 
They also could experiment with other possibilities which are 
limited only by the creativity of the federal judiciary, the CJRA 
advisory groups, the FJC, the AO, and other informed experts, such 
as Judge Schwarzer; by the feasibility of the various proposals that 
are developed; and by the manageability of the overall effort.27 In 
short, Congress should support broad experimentation but be 
attuned to the possibility that the project might become unwieldy 
or that federal civil procedure may experience too much additional 
EvlDENCE, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991) {containing draft of withdrawn proposal 
that prescribed experimentation with inconsistent local rules for not greater than five years). 
23 ld. {Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 26{a)), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. at 87-88; see also supra 
note 19 and accompanying text. See generally Tobias, supra note 16, at 140-41. 
24 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CML 
PRocEDURE 26 {May 1992). See generally Winter, supra note 5. 
25 I assume that both formulations satisfy this standard. Most EIDCs have apparently 
encountered little difficulty implementing the initial draft;. Respected observers, including 
Judge Schwarzer and Judge Winter, believe that the second draft is workable. 
28 See Bell, supra note 1, at 49-53. 
ZT If too many districts experiment with too many disclosure procedures, the effort could 
become impossible to administer. Congress, therefore, should desigriate a small number of 
procedures that seem most promising. 
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balkanization. 28 
Once Congress has designated the appropriate forms of automatic 
disclosure for experimentation in the proper number of federal 
districts, it must ensure that these efforts are correctly assessed. 
Congress should mandate that independent, expert evaluators 
establish baselines and measure the efficacy of different disclosure 
procedures over a sufficient period to afford a reliable sense of each 
procedure?s relative effectiveness. When that information has been 
assembled, analyzed, and synthesized, the rule revisors and 
Congress should be able to ascertain which disclosure mechanisms 
are most efficacious in specific contexts and to prescribe them as 
indicated.29 If one procedure seems vastly superior and appears 
applicable across a broad range of circumstances, its embodiment 
in a national rule ~ay be warranted.30 
III. CONCLUSION 
Judge Bell and Judge Schwarzer have contributed significantly 
to the national debate that is currently raging over automatic 
disclosure. Congress should address this controversy by drawing 
upon the civil justice reform effort that it instituted under the 1990 
statute. Appropriately measured experimentation should help to 
identify those automatic disclosure procedures that will prove most 
efficacious. 
28 See generally Tobias, Balkanization, supra note 20; Tobias, Recalibrating, supra note 
20. . 
29 See Tobias, Recalibrating, supra note 20, at 128-32 (similarly suggesting broader 
implementation of c.JRA). 
30 See Tobias, Recalibrating, supra note 20, at 130 n.75; Tobias, supra note 16, at 147. 
See generally Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Ruka and the Tension With 
Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REY. 853 (1989). 
